The Jacksonville Harbor Project, first authorized as a Federal navigation project in 1880, follows the St. John's River for approximately 27 miles (43.5 kilometers) in northeast Florida, beginning at the river's entrance to the Atlantic Ocean and ending near the downtown area of the City of Jacksonville. The main feature of the project is a shipping channel for large, ocean-going, commercial vessels, and includes other features such as jetties and training walls. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Jacksonville Port Authority are the Federal and non-Federal sponsors, respectively, of the project. Since its initial authorization, the project has received eleven additional authorizations from Congress for improvements. The most recent one was in 1999, for deepening the project from 38-feet (11.6 meters) to 40-feet (12.2.m). In 2002, an additional five-mile (eight-km) segment was added to the deepening effort. Construction is taking place in three phases and began in 2001, continuing to today.
INTRODUCTION
The Jacksonville Harbor Project was first authorized as a Federal navigation project in 1880. This navigation channel follows the St. John's River for approximately 27 miles (43.5 km) in northeast Florida, from the river's entrance at the Atlantic Ocean to the downtown area of the City of Jacksonville (Figure 1 ). The project centers on a shipping channel for large, ocean-going, commercial vessels, and includes jetties and training walls. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Jacksonville Port Authority are the Federal and non-Federal sponsors, respectively, of the project. Since its initial authorization, the project has received eleven additional authorizations from Congress for improvements. The most recent one was in 1999, for deepening the majority of the project from 38 feet (11.6 m) to 40 feet (12.2 m). A relook at the project in 2002 resulted in approval for deepening an additional five miles (eight km) of the project to 40 feet (12.2 m). Construction of the 40-foot (12.2 m) project is taking place in three phases, two of which are complete and the third of which will be built later this year.
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Figure 1. Aerial view of the Jacksonville Harbor Project
The 1999 Congressional authorization for deepening the project was supported by a feasibility report prepared in 1998 after a lengthy feasibility study. The improvements recommended were constructed in two phases. The first phase, Phase I, deepened the West Blount Island Channel (Figure 2) along Cuts F and G to a depth of 38 feet (11.6 m) and raised the dikes on the east end of the Bartram Island placement area to accommodate all of the dredged material. Cut F was also be realigned by a shift of 50 feet (15.2 m) to the east. The second phase, Phase II, deepened the main ship channel to a depth of 40 feet (12.2 m) from the entrance channel (Station 0+00, Bar Cut-3) to Mile 14.7 (Station 6+53, Cut-50) and constructed advanced maintenance zones inside the Federal channel limits as well as at the east end of the area known as Mill Cove, along Cut-42. Dredged material was placed in the following disposal areas: West Bartram Island; Buck Island; Beach Disposal Area A south of the Jetties at Mayport to the end of Hannah Park; Beach Disposal Area B at Atlantic Beach; Beach Disposal Area C at Jacksonville Beach; and an offshore Artificial Reef.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville District Figure 2. Schematic of the 40-foot (12.2-m) harbor project
In 2002 approval for deepening another stretch of the navigation channel was granted, based on a general re-evaluation report that followed a focused feasibilitytype study. The improvements approved by this process are scheduled for construction in late 2009 and 2010. This added enhancement is known as 'Phase III' and will deepen the ship channel from Cut-50 (Station 6+53.19) to Station 65+00 of the Terminal Channel to a depth of 40 feet (12.2 m). All dredged material will be placed in the Bartram Island placement area.
When the deepening was planned cost estimates were prepared for authorization and appropriation (budgeting) based on certain assumptions. Because of the Corps' lengthy life cycle at the time of contract award the contract price might be substantially different. By studying construction costs developed in the planning phase for the Jacksonville Harbor Project deepening and comparing these to contractor bid prices, and by focusing on the assumptions made during planning and the design details in the plans and specifications, valuable lessons learned might be identified. These lessons learned could be applied to future planning projects in an effort to better capture construction costs.
METHODS
By conducting a literature search, documented costs of the 40-foot (12.2-m) deepening were compiled and compared to describe differences between those anticipated during planning and those realized at the time of bidding. Cost items that were addressed in the plan formulation for justification of the authorizing documents for the 40-foot (12.2-m) project were researched, focusing on construction features that were the basis of the cost estimates in the planning (feasibility-level) reports. These features include dredging, placement area construction and environmental protection. Also, cost information was gathered on the bid items from the contractor's award packages or bid abstracts.
To compare costs, pricing information was gathered from the following documents: (USACE, 2000) . Quantities were compiled in spreadsheet format, from the planning studies and as reflected in the contract documents. Unit costs were calculated in current dollars to reflect the planning-level and the award-level information.
Construction methodology information was gathered from the planning reports that served as the basis for the project authorization/approval (USACE, 1998 and USACE, 2000) and also from interviews with representatives of the Corps and the contractor that performed the work (B.C. Blake, personal communication, 24 Quantities expected to be removed as of the planning phase were approximately 4,500,000 cubic yards (1,140,000 cm). At the time of bidding, the quantities to be removed had increased to approximately 5,700,000 cubic yards (1,444,000 cm). 
DISCUSSION
The Corps' project life cycle includes the following phases: planning; preconstruction engineering and design; construction; operation and maintenance. Once a project is planned, and authorization and appropriation (funding) are secured, several years may have passed until construction is begun. During this time many factors may change, for example, project conditions such as shoaling volumes and requirements to protect the environment. While inflation may be taken into account when considering budgeting for projects to be built in future years, appropriate allowances may not be made during the planning phase for all factors affecting construction costs.
Deepening the Jacksonville Harbor project was expected to cost (in current dollars) about $60,000,000 and award pricing was nearly $110,000,000. The quantity of material to be removed was projected to be about 4,500,000 cubic yards (1,140,000 cm), yet at the time the work was bid that amount had increased to 5,700,000 cubic yards (1,444,000 cm). Some of the cost increase would result from the larger volume of material to be dredged. Calculating unit costs, however, shows that there was an increase in unit cost, from $13.32 per cubic yard ($52.28 During the first feasibility study, in the mid-1990s, time was of the essence due to revelations about the upcoming Panama Canal deepening and the length of the Corps life-cycle process. With the Panama Canal deepening on the horizon and set for completion in the year 2014, many ports along the east cost of the United States were examining deepening as a way to accommodate the larger vessels that were expected to pass through the canal. Because of perceived time constraints, some of the technical studies needed to justify improvements to a Federal harbor project may not have received the attention they should have and may have either been neglected all together or completed to a level lower in quality than they could have been were circumstances otherwise. In the case of the Jacksonville Harbor deepening study, one component that may have suffered due to time constraints is the geotechnical investigation. During the study phase, the rock underlying the channel areas to be deepened was thought to be 'soft rock', capable of being removed with a standard, but large, pipeline dredge. Areas identified as being underlain by harder rock were intended to be treated with the use of a punch barge, to break up this substrate and render it sufficient for removal by a pipeline dredge. There are many large pipeline dredges in the fleet available to the Corps for construction, so at this time lack of competition was not considered a factor in design. Thus, Table 3 shows a small quantity of material to be 'punched' with removal by a pipline dredge.
Coupled with the geotechnical investigation that was perhaps smaller in scope than it should have been is the application of the geotechnical data to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) compliance document. The 1998 feasibility study relied on a NEPA document prepared previously for Jacksonville Harbor and did not address the need for blasting the rock prior to removal. Because the NEPA document did not cover blasting, permits required for construction and issued by the State of Florida (Water Quality Certification), did not include blasting. Therefore, when the contract documents were prepared, no blasting was allowed.
Because no blasting was allowed, and because the rock to be removed was known to be so much harder at the time of contract advertisement than anticipated during the planning study, the type of dredge needed to perform the work was limited to those pipeline dredges with a rock cutterhead. This is a very special category of construction equipment, of which few pieces exist. Competition, a cornerstone of Federal contracting, may have been limited because of the limited equipment availability. Lack of competition is thought to be one driver of increased costs.
During the process of preparing the contract plans and specifications, when the realization came that the rock would be harder in character and require specialized construction equipment for removal, the Corps developed a cost engineering software program to estimate the cost of construction using this dredge plant, a rock pipeline application for its Cost Engineering Dredge Estimating Program (CEDEP). Taking into consideration the costs of this type of equipment accounts for some of the increase in the cost per cubic yard.
While the increase in cost per cubic yard, and therefore total cost for construction, of deepening the Jacksonville Harbor project, from time of planning to time of contract award, may be explained by economic factors such a rising fuel and material prices, other, more significant factors may be involved, over which there may have been some control. For example, the lack of a very detailed, thorough, geotechnical investigation in the planning stage, due to a perceived lack of time, may have lead to the incorrect conclusion that the rock underlying the channel could be removed without blasting using conventional dredging plant. This premise then led to failure to incorporate needed studies, language and precautions for blasting in the State of Florida Water Quality Certification, effectively prohibiting blasting as a construction technique. In a domino effect, this led to the incorrect assumption that a standard cuttersuction dredge could be used for material removal. Specialized dredging plant, the rock cuttersuction dredge, was needed, plant that is not readily available, affecting competition, and plant that costs more to operate, both driving up the price of the project.
Lessons learned from this experience are 1)Decisions driven by science and engineering are best made based on the technical and not time, and 2)Partnering with industry during planning may provide valuable insights into construction equipment and methods that ought to be considered but otherwise would not.
The first lesson learned, to focus on the technical quality of an investigation and to not be motivated to rush through an analysis because of time constraints, stems from the inadequacies revealed by the scope of the geotechnical investigation applied to the planning study for the Jacksonville Harbor deepening. Had more data been collected and additional testing performed on samples collected, the extent and nature of the rock would have been better known. This would have forced blasting of the rock to be incorporated into the NEPA document. It would also have changed the assumptions made in the planning-level cost estimate concerning how much rock was to be removed and what dredging plant would be suitable for removal, that would have maintained a basis for competition and not singled out one type of dredge or one dredging firm.
The second lesson learned, to partner with the dredging industry during planning, would allow dredging firms to contribute their experience and expertise in constructing projects using dredge plant early on and thereby influence the development of the design and constructability of a project in a positive manner. 'Industry days' are common for projects ready to be advertised and they should be held during planning as well. An 'industry day' is a form of a public meeting where firms are invited to review designs for projects and comment on their constructability, or ask questions to clarify contract requirements. Holding an 'industry day' during planning when alternative plans are still under consideration and one specific plan has not yet been chosen for construction would result in more detailed, thoughtful consideration of each option from a technical perspective. In the case of the Jacksonville Harbor deepening project, the issue with the rock and its dredgeability, and the implications on the NEPA documentation and permitting, might have surfaced and been debated, researched and resolved early on, rather than later. Had this happened early on and the assumptions in the cost estimates been different, the pricing of the project might have been more reflective, at the time of planning, of the actual bidding.
For this case study, contractor bid prices were used to compare to planninglevel prices. Bid prices may not reflect the actual price of a project due to construction modifications and claims. A suggestion for further study is to research the actual price paid and compare that with the planning-level price. Since actual price paid would most likely be higher than bid price, the discrepancy between the actual price and the planning-level price would be greater. By examining the basis of the modification or claim, additional insights might be revealed that might also prove valuable as lessons learned.
CONCLUSIONS
Construction costs developed in the planning phase for the Jacksonville Harbor Project 40-foot (12.2 m) deepening were compared to contractor bid and award prices. By focusing on the assumptions made during planning and the design details in the plans and specifications, valuable lessons learned were identified. These lessons learned can be applied to future planning projects in an effort to better capture construction costs. For the Jacksonville Harbor deepening project, anticipated construction costs at the time of planning were $60,000,000, in today's dollars. The total contractor bid price was $110,000,000, again in today's dollars. Quantities expected to be removed as of the planning phase were approximately 4,500,000 cubic yards (1,140,000 cm). At the time of bidding, the quantities to be removed had increased to approximately 5,700,000 cubic yards (1,444,000 cm). The anticipated unit cost, in 2009 dollars, for dredging was $13.32 per cubic yard ($52.28 pcm). The award unit cost, also in 2009 dollars, was $19.29 per cubic yard ($75.70 pcm).
Assumptions made during planning that may not have held true include character of the subsurface, dredge plant availability and lack of inclusion of certain construction techniques (rock blasting) in permits. During the study phase, the rock underlying the channel areas to be deepened was thought to be 'soft rock', capable of being removed with a standard, but large, pipeline dredge. Areas identified as being underlain by harder rock were intended to be addressed with the use of a punch barge, to break up this substrate and render it sufficient for removal by a pipeline dredge. When the plans and specifications were developed it was revealed that the rock was much harder than anticipated, and more extensive in areal coverage. This meant different, more expensive, dredge plant would be needed to remove the rock. This dredge plant is not as readily available in industry as is its non-rock counterpart, affecting competition and possibly driving up the price of the project. Finally, the premise of dredgeable soft rock then led to failure to incorporate needed studies, language and precautions for blasting in the State of Florida Water Quality Certification, effectively prohibiting blasting as a construction technique. This also may have limited competition, increasing prices.
Lessons learned from the analysis of cost and price information for the Jacksonville Harbor 40-foot (12.2 m) project deepening are that decisions driven by science and engineering are best made based on the technical and not time, and that partnering with industry during planning may provide valuable insights into construction equipment and methods that ought to be considered but otherwise would not.
